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Rethinking Financial Literacy in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Abstract 
Systemic risks and other factors that contributed to the global financial crisis have 
highlighted the need to reconsider the scope and nature of financial literacy initiatives 
and programs. In this article we argue the case to rethink financial literacy and the 
need for integrated solutions that explicitly incorporate solutions to behavioural 
shortcomings exhibited by individuals in their financial decision-making. While 
recognising the need to consider behavioural biases in individuals’ financial 
decisions, to date, regulatory responses have largely ignored those biases in their 
proposed education and other strategies designed to address poor financial literacy 
and improve financial disclosure that, in turn, will improve financial decision-making.    
 
 
The ultimate protection against financial excess and crisis is a more sophisticated 
population of consumers and investors.1  
Introduction  
The global financial crisis (GFC) has refocused attention on the vulnerability of global capital 
markets to large-scale, systemic risks and the urgent need for sustainable solutions that will 
minimise the impact of future shocks. While the causes of the crisis are numerous and 
complex, mispricing of financial risk is often at the heart of most explanations for the 
observed market failings. The mispricing of risk has been attributed to a number of factors. 
Guyatt2 attributes the excessive risk-taking to three systematic problems: (1) behavioural 
biases of individual decision-makers; (2) short-termism that is built into the corporate and 
financial market system; and (3) an absence of acceptance of responsibility by individuals, 
financial institutions and corporations for their actions, and consequently, responsibility for 
the broader functioning of capital markets. To overcome these debilitating problems Guyatt 
calls for collaboration by universal owners3 and institutional investors with other industry 
players, regulators and policy makers in shaping the direction of future financial markets. 
This collaborative process should seek solutions that explicitly address behavioural flaws in 
financial decision-making of individuals and institutions, and introduce accountability and 
                                                 
1 Lo (2009), p 5. 
2 Guyatt (2009).   
3 Hawley and Williams (2000, 2007) refer to large fiduciary institutions, such as pension funds, mutual funds 
and bank trusts, as ‘universal owners’.  
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non-regulatory mechanisms that account for the behavioural biases of market participants. 
Guyatt summarises the challenge as follows:  
The individuals that make up the capital market system are complex, driven by a variety of 
social, economic and psychological influences. Until we move closer to recognizing and 
accepting that, we will constantly fail to build systems around the realities of human nature 
and therefore suffer from the extreme outcomes when conventional thinking is left 
unquestioned.4    
The factors contributing to the global financial crisis highlight the need to rethink the scope 
and nature of financial literacy initiatives and programs from a number of perspectives. First, 
from the individual investor perspective, the identified behavioural biases need to be directly 
considered in the investment choices offered to investors, how information is presented to 
investors, and in education programs provided to investors. This is a particularly critical issue 
for superannuation fund members who are increasingly responsible for investment and other 
financial decisions related to their superannuation savings. Second, from the universal owner 
and institutional investor perspective, the increasing complexity of financial products and 
short-termist behaviour exhibited by these players suggests that financial literacy levels also 
need to be raised among these key market participants. Third, from a regulatory and policy-
making perspective, high priority should be given to developing and encouraging universal 
owners to adopt financial literacy programs that enable individuals and intuitions to 
understand and effectively address the behavioural biases that inhibit effective financial 
decision-making. With the involvement of private sector organisations in delivering those 
programs, regulators also need to establish appropriate safeguards to ensure the programs are 
unbiased and are not just merely marketing exercises to sell product. Based on these 
perspectives, in this article we argue the case to rethink financial literacy and the need for 
integrated solutions that explicitly incorporate solutions to behavioural shortcomings 
exhibited by individuals in their financial decision-making.   
The Financial Literacy Challenge 
As in most countries, educating Australia’s population to adequate financial literacy levels is 
a major challenge, particularly given that a large proportion of Australians do not have basic 
literacy and numeracy skills. Recent Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data show that 
only about half of Australians aged between 15 and 74 have sufficient levels of prose literacy, 
                                                 
4 Guyatt (2009), p 3.  
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document literacy and numeracy5 that are needed to deal with “the complex demands of 
everyday life and work”,6 and only 30 percent have adequate problem solving skills.7 When 
these poor levels of literacy and numeracy are considered in the context of investment 
decision-making, such as a superannuation fund member choosing an investment option, it is 
clear that only a small proportion of the population is likely have the requisite level of 
financial literacy.  
In light of poor general literacy and numeracy across the Australian population, a germane 
question in a post-crisis world is: how much effort should be invested in providing universal 
financial literacy education to bring most Australians up to a level of financial literacy at 
which they are capable of making informed investment decisions? As highlighted in the 
superannuation choice framework developed by Brown Gallery and Gallery8 prior to the 
introduction of the “choice” regime, it is unrealistic (and perhaps undesirable) to expect all 
superannuation fund members to acquire the requisite knowledge and skills to become 
informed ‘investors’ for two key reasons: (1) not having the capacity to achieve an adequate 
level of financially literacy (cognitive capacity constraints); and (2) having the capacity, but 
unwilling to become financially literate (apathy constraints). It is important to recognise that 
like general literacy and numeracy, financial literacy is not an absolute (ie you are or are not 
financial literate), but rather, financial literacy can be measured on a continuum ranging from 
little or no understanding of financial matters to highly sophisticated financial literacy. Given 
this continuum, the impact of the behavioural constraints are likely to, at least partly, vary 
according to financial literacy levels. Recognition of the impact of the behavioural constraints 
is therefore essential in developing targeted education programs that aim to raise the level of 
financial literacy. This is particularly important with respect to changing attitudes towards 
long-term savings (eg superannuation).  
In its report on agribusiness managed investment schemes, the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services observed: 
A potential problem with the disclosure-based regulatory approach occurs when the 
products being marketed are too complex for unsophisticated investors to be in a 
                                                 
5 ‘Prose literacy’ is the ability to understand various types of narrative text (e.g. able to read a newspaper), 
‘document literacy’ is the ability to access and use information in various formats (e.g. read a bus timetable), 
and ‘numeracy’ is mathematical ability in diverse situations: ABS (2008), p 4.  
6 ABS (2007). 
7 ‘Problem solving’ is “goal-directed thinking and action in situations for which no routine solution is 
available”: ABS (2008), p 4.  
8 Brown et al (2002). 
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position to make an informed decision about them, even where the relevant disclosure 
requirements are met. This raises the question of whether some products should be 
limited to institutional or sophisticated retail investors, with the consequential effect 
of reducing the efficiency of the market and potentially raising the cost of capital.9  
Emerging from the global financial crisis, questions have been raised not only about the 
financial literacy of retail investors, but also about the extent to which institutional investors 
understood the complex products they were investing in, and that of financial advisers who 
were providing retail investors with advice on complex financial products. Lo10 suggests that 
a contributing factor to the crisis was “corporate leaders and directors who did not fully 
understand the risks of the securities in which they were investing”.  Similarly, Lo suggests 
that the rate of financial engineering and development of new financial products outpaced the 
development of expertise of senior management and board members, and operational staff in 
the financial institutions issuing the new financial instruments.11 He also suggests that the 
research underlying the product development was conducted by staff with sophisticated 
quantitative skills from PhD programs in mathematics, physics and computer science, but 
with no formal training in finance or economics. 12  
Financial Literacy and Superannuation Savings   
The Government’s introduction of compulsory superannuation in 1992 through the 
Superannuation Guarantee regime13 means almost all working Australians now have some 
level of retirement savings, and superannuation has become the second largest asset of most 
individuals, after their home. The policy decision to leave the management of those savings 
in the hands of the private sector also means that those workers are responsible for decisions 
about how their superannuation is invested and managed.  This responsibility was further 
reinforced with the introduction in 2005 of legislation requiring employers to offer new 
employees a choice of superannuation fund on commencement of employment14 and with an 
ever-increasing number of funds offering their members within-fund investment choice.  
                                                 
9 PJCCFS (2009a), para 4.55. 
10 Lo (2009), p 4. 
11 Lo (2009), p 30. 
12 Lo (2009), p 32. 
13 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (SGAA) and its Regulations (SGAR) and the 
Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act 1992.  
14 Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (SGAA) Part 3A.   
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While this responsibility is placed squarely on the shoulders of superannuation fund 
members, historically, few have actively engaged with their superannuation, as indicated by 
low levels of choice being exercised by members.15 When faced with choosing a fund to join 
when starting with a new employer, and/or choosing an investment option within the joined 
fund, the vast majority of superannuation members do not make a choice and consequently 
join the default fund nominated by employers, and/or the default investment option, 
nominated by superannuation fund trustees. This lack of engagement is also indicative of 
members generally paying little or no ongoing attention to the management of their 
superannuation.  
This absence of engagement with superannuation can at least partly be attributed to poor 
understanding of superannuation and investments. Fear16 found that 44 percent of 
respondents in his survey agreed the superannuation is too complicated to understand 
properly and 46 percent considered investments are too complex to comprehend. 
Consequently, some people appear to avoid making difficult decisions about their 
superannuation or retirement life style until they can avoid it no longer.17 This inertia has 
been recognised in the behavioural literature as a form of ‘bounded rationality’ where 
individuals faced with complex decisions requiring them to make a choice will procrastinate, 
which ultimately results in sub-optimal outcomes.18  
One of the effects of the GFC was to jolt many individuals out of such inertia as they saw 
large declines in their superannuation savings, learning, perhaps for the first time, that there is 
a connection between the world’s financial markets and their superannuation. Bowerman19 
suggests that a positive outcome of the GFC may be that superannuation fund members will 
pay more attention to how their funds are managed and perform relative to other funds. 
However, for individuals to effectively monitor their superannuation and make informed 
decisions, requires considerable improvement in financial literacy levels, particularly 
understanding of investment products and concepts.  
 
                                                 
15 Industry research shows that fund switching rates are only about 8% per year and much of this is due to 
employees changing jobs (Clare 2007). Similarly, 82 percent of superannuation fund members are in their 
funds’ default investment option (SuperRatings 2006); it is assumed that most of those in the default option did 
not make an active choice.   
16 Fear (2008).  
17 Fear (2008), 34.  
18 Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2003); Madrian and Shea (2001); Mitchell and Utkus (2004).  
19 Bowerman (2009).  
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Understanding investment concepts 
Understanding risks associated with investment products is central to investors’ investment 
decision-making. To properly evaluate their risk exposure, investors need to understand the 
financial risks associated with various investment types and asset allocation options. There is 
evidence showing that people generally lack an appreciation of financial risk and often view 
risk as loss20 rather than variability of return.  
ASIC highlights the importance of individuals understanding the investment basics of 
diversification and risk, particularly as most individuals are responsible for decisions about 
how their superannuation savings are invested.21 Results of general population surveys have 
shown that only about 50 percent of individuals understand the importance of diversification, 
and this level declines to about only one-third of people who have a low level of financial 
literacy skills.22 Many consumers similarly do not understand the basic risk-return 
relationship23 as demonstrated by two thirds of respondents to a Financial Literacy 
Foundation survey indicating that they “would not consider both risk and return when 
choosing an investment”.24  
In their study of superannuation fund members’ financial literacy, Gallery et al25 found 
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of risk associated with the various investment 
options offered by the fund. While they found that survey participants generally had adequate 
basic financial literacy, they found significant shortcomings in participants’ understanding of 
the basic risk-return relationship. They question “whether large numbers of members have 
the requisite knowledge and skills to undertake even a most basic assessment of the relative 
risks of the investment options on offer.”26 They recommend targeted programs that 
specifically address complex financial literacy for the more active and engaged fund 
members. The benefits of improving financial literacy can also extend beyond financial 
benefits. Taylor et al show that moving an individual from a low level to average level of 
financial capability improves that individual’s psychological wellbeing by about 6 percent.27  
 
                                                 
20 See for example the Financial Literacy Foundation (2007) survey results.  
21 ASIC (2009), p 78.  
22 ANZ (2008).  
23 OECD (2005).  
24 Financial Literary Foundation (2007) p viii.  
25 Gallery et al (forthcoming).  
26 Gallery et al (forthcoming).  
27 Taylor et al (2005). 
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Risk of Overconfidence  
As people become more financially literate and more actively engaged with their 
superannuation, there is the danger that they do not recognise the limitations to their financial 
knowledge and abilities. There is considerable evidence that people are generally 
overconfident in their judgments about the likelihood of events occurring and estimating the 
quantity of outcomes.28 Overconfidence is partly explained by ‘self-attribution bias’, where 
individuals attribute success to their own skills and blame failure on bad luck, rather than 
their poor judgement, and ‘hindsight bias’, where after an event has occurred, individuals 
believe they predicted the event, giving them confidence that they are able to predict the 
future better than they actually can.29  
This general overconfidence in judgement also manifests in overconfidence in financial 
capabilities that had been found in population surveys in Australia and overseas. Those 
surveys show that while individuals are confident in their own financial abilities, tests of their 
understanding of basic finance indicate their actual knowledge is limited.30  For example, a 
2003 German study “found that although 80 per cent of respondents felt confident about their 
understanding of financial issues, only 42 per cent were able to answer correctly just half of 
the 35 survey questions.”31 Overconfidence may lead to individuals failing to realise that they 
need to become better educated in financial matters or seek professional advice.32   
In their survey of superannuation fund members, Gallery et al33 found that this 
overconfidence tends to be more pronounced among individuals with moderate levels of 
financial literacy. Figure 1 shows that 90 percent of respondents who self-rated their financial 
literacy as poor or very poor, achieved low to medium scores on tests of their understanding 
of investment risks and returns concepts. However, only half of those who self-rated rated 
their financial literacy skills as good of very good achieved an above-medium score on the 
objective tests. This finding of overconfidence among those who have some financial skills 
brings to mind the adage ‘a little knowledge is a dangerous thing’, particularly in the 
superannuation context where individuals may not seek timely advice or may not make 
                                                 
28 Barberis and Thaler (2003).  
29 Barberis and Thaler (2003) p 1064. 
30 OECD (2005).  
31 OECD (2005), p 46. 
32 OECD (2005); Lusardi and Mitchell (2007).  
33 Gallery et al (2009).  
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appropriate investment decisions, with potentially dire consequences for their retirement 
savings.34     
 
 
Source: Gallery et al (2009) p 45. 
Figure 1 Comparison of self-rated financial literacy with scores on tests of financial literacy  
     
Challenges for Financial Education Programs   
Improving financial literacy through education programs has become a global issue. To 
address concerns about low levels of financial literacy, the OECD35 established the Financial 
Education Project in 2004 to assist regulators and policymakers in member countries to 
analyse and assess the effectiveness of existing financial literacy programs, and to develop 
new education programs. Various government-initiated programs have been established, such 
as the National Strategy for Financial Capability developed by the Financial Services 
Authority in the U.K, programs of the Financial Literacy Education Commission in the US, 
and the Understanding Money program developed by the Financial Literacy Foundation in 
Australia.36  
                                                 
34 Gallery et al (2009).  
35 OECD (2005).  
36 The Australian Government established the Financial Literacy Foundation (FLF) in 2005; its aim is to “build 
the capacity of all Australians to better understand and manage financial risk, deal effectively with market 
complexity and take advantage of increased competition and choice in Australia’s finance sector” (FLF, 2007, 
p.96). Shortly after its election, the Labor Government transferred the functions of the FLF to the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) from 1 July 2008 (see Wayne Swan, Federal Treasurer’s Media 
Release No. 55 “Treasurer announces ASIC to take on financial literacy”, 13 May 2008 at 
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The OECD37 defines financial education as  
the process by which financial consumers/investors improve their understanding of 
financial products, concepts and risks and, through information, instruction and/or 
objective advice, develop the skills and confidence to become more aware of financial 
risks and opportunities, to make informed choices, to know where to go for help, and 
to take other effective actions to improve their financial well-being.38  
In adopting this definition, the OECD39 distinguishes financial education from consumer 
protection, viewing them as “complements rather than substitutes”. While some consumers 
may choose to acquire the requisite financial knowledge to enable them to make informed 
decisions, “others may be unwilling or unable to do so and for those individuals consumer 
protection is important”. 40  
Nevertheless, financial education is seen as a key consumer protection measure. Shifting 
investment decision-making to individuals gives rise to the need for them to take 
responsibility for managing the associated financial risks and become educated consumers.41 
With the worldwide trend of individuals having to take responsibility for investment 
decisions associated with their retirement savings, the OECD42 established a set of core rights 
and protection of superannuation/pension fund members, including the right for members to 
be provided with “sufficient opportunity to acquire the financial skills or education and other 
assistance that they need in order to make appropriate investment decisions in their pension 
plans”. 
There are however many challenges in attempting to raise the financial literacy levels of the 
general population. The Financial Literacy Foundation43 highlights these challenges:  
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/055.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Ye
ar=&DocType=0).   
37 OECD (2005), p 13. 
38 The elements in the OECD’s (2005, pp 13-14) definition of financial education are explained as follows:  
 information involves providing consumers with facts, data, and specific knowledge to make them 
aware of financial opportunities, choices, and consequences; 
 instruction involves ensuring that individuals acquire the skills and ability to understand financial terms 
and concepts, through the provision of training and guidance; and 
 advice involves providing consumers with counsel about generic financial issues and products so that 
they can make the best use of the financial information and instruction they have received.  
39 OECD (2008), p 105. 
40 OECD (2008), p 105. 
41 de Rato (2007).  
42 OECD (2003), p 13.  
43 Financial Literacy Foundation (2007), p xii. 
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A key consideration [for providers of financial literacy services and resources] relates 
to the practicalities of building pathways to effective consumer engagement with 
money issues – of putting appropriate emphasis on motivation in design and delivery 
strategies by promoting the personal relevance of better money management, and the 
prospect of the greater choices and opportunities, security and other quality of life 
benefits that better money skills can provide. 
Simply providing comprehensive and well intentioned education resources will not be 
adequate. There is no shortage of quality resources available already to consumers 
with an active interest in building their money skills. The challenge is to promote 
engagement and motivation to those who, for reasons of disinterest in the issue, lack 
of perceived relevance, stress or … other obstacles …, are not currently seeking to 
build their money skills. 
It is evident that financial education programs need to be targeted to engage those who are in 
most need of them, particularly reaching those who may be overconfident in their knowledge 
and skills, and thus are unaware of the need for them to improve their financial literacy.44 
Accordingly, the major challenge in developing and delivering financial education programs 
is addressing behavioural issues and biases that presently limit the effectiveness of those 
programs.  
However, education programs alone are unlikely to lead to improved financial decision-
making if the information available to investors is not understandable and does not meet their 
information needs.   
Financial Literacy and Disclosure 
Commentators have emphasised the need for greater attention to be given to the dual aspects 
of better disclosure to investors and improving the financial literacy of investors. The full 
disclosure principle is well established in corporate regulation as a means of addressing the 
information asymmetry problem between corporate decision-makers and external 
shareholders and other stakeholders who do not have access to internal corporate information. 
In the absence of regulation, it is assumed that companies will not disclose the optimum level 
of information to mitigate the asymmetry problem.45 Regulators have extended the full 
disclosure principle as a cornerstone of consumer protection measures that have been 
instituted under the various financial reforms over the past decade. Also, as observed by 
Battellino, “one of the most important challenges raised by a disclosure-based regime is that 
it places a significant premium on financial literacy.”46 While disclosure of relevant and 
                                                 
44 Smith and Stewart (2008).  
45 Beaver (1998).  
46 Battellino (2007), p 22). 
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reliable information is a key requirement of informed investor decision making, in the 
absence of sufficient levels of financial literacy, disclosure is unlikely to be effective.47 Thus, 
a key challenge for regulators is to develop and implement disclosure regulation and other 
initiatives that deliver the essential information to meet the decision-making needs of 
investors with different levels of financial literacy.  
  
Regulatory Reforms: Disclosure as Consumer Protection  
A primary objective of the Australian Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth) (FSR) was to 
“promote confident and informed decision-making by consumers of financial products …”,48 
and accordingly introduced more stringent licensing and disclosure rules.  The intention was 
to make the understanding of financial products and advice easier for investors, promoting 
consumer confidence with improved disclosure quality and transparency through an enhanced 
disclosure regime. In addressing this need for improved disclosure quality and transparency 
to assist investors with understanding investment products, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
now requires issuers or sellers of financial products to produce (and keep up to date) product 
disclosure statements (PDSs).  
The broad objectives of PDSs are to help investors “compare and make informed choices 
about financial products”;49 to meet those objectives, information included in the PDS “must 
be worded and presented in a clear, concise and effective manner”.50 As the legislative 
requirements applying to PDSs were drafted to enhance flexibility, the legislation does not 
give specific guidance on preparation of PDSs.51 However, ASIC has issued a set of Good 
Disclosure Principles to assist issuers with compliance. The stated principles are: disclosure 
should be timely, relevant and complete, promote understanding and comparison, highlight 
important information, and have regard to consumers’ needs.52  
Despite these objectives for PDSs and guidance given by the Good Disclosure principles, 
PDSs have been widely criticised for being too long, complex and difficult to understand.53 
                                                 
47 ASIC (2009).  
48 Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (Cth) s 760A. 
49 ASIC (2007) para 168.7. 
50 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1013C(4). 
51 ASIC (2007), para 168.9. 
52 ASIC (2007), para 168.10. 
53 See Sherry and Tanner (2008a) and submissions to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services (PJCCFS, 2007) inquiry into the structure and operation of the superannuation industry.   
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As a consequence, it was claimed that many investors failed to read the PDSs.54 In response, 
Senator Nick Sherry suggested that PDSs should pass what he calls the ‘Burnie pub test’ in 
that they should be understandable to the average person.55 Whether such simplification is 
achievable needs to be considered in context of the drivers of PDS length and complexity. 
ASIC attributes possible drivers to (1) the regulatory requirements for high-level content, (2) 
complexity of products which inevitably results in complexity in explanations of those 
products, and (3) risk averse financial product issuers providing more, rather than less, 
information where there is uncertainty about legislative disclosure requirements.56 Thus these 
drivers would need to be addressed in any PDS simplification reforms.  
In the first stage of reforms to simplify and reduce the length of PDSs, the Government 
introduced example PDSs for First Home Saver Accounts that are limited to four A4 pages.57 
These PDSs are expected to “make it much easier for people who are interested in using First 
Home Saver Accounts to understand and compare the products on offer [with] key product 
information … provided … in concise, plain English [that] can be read and understood in just 
a few minutes”.58 Senator Sherry deems these example PDSs pass his ‘Burnie pub test’ as 
they are “simple” and “clear”.59 First Home Saver Accounts are relatively simple financial 
products and therefore have not presented much of a challenge to develop short, plain 
language disclosure documents. A greater challenge in addressing this ‘information overload’ 
issue will be to design simpler and shorter PDSs for more complex financial products, such as 
superannuation.  
The Financial Service Working Group (FSWG) is devising short and simplified PDS 
disclosure requirements for superannuation and ‘simple’ managed investment scheme 
products, and these will be contained in PDSs with a maximum page limit of 10 to 12 
                                                 
54Research commissioned by ASIC found retail investors in failed Australian Capital Reserve Ltd were more 
influenced by advertisements than information in disclosure documents, and many did not seem to understand 
the riskiness of that investment (ASIC, 2009).  
55 Senator Sherry (2008) considers a PDS is effective “if it can be easily understood by the average person, in 
the average pub, in an average community, like the city of Burnie” in Tasmania. 
56 ASIC (2009), p 58. 
57 The example PDSs were developed by the Financial Services Working Group (FSWG), which was 
established in February 2008 by the newly elected Labor Government. The FSWG comprises senior officials 
from the Department of Treasury, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the 
Department of Finance and Deregulation; its role is to address key issues associated with financial services 
advice and products.    
58 Sherry and Tanner (2008b). 
59 Sherry and Tanner (2008b). 
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pages.60 Given that superannuation fund product disclosure statements generally range 
between 50 and 100 pages, restricting their length to 12 pages would mean that most of the 
information currently contained in PDSs would be excluded. ‘Incorporation by reference’ 
regulation introduced in August 200761, already allows fund trustees to reduce the content of 
PDSs. It is however unclear as to what type and extent of information that might be excluded 
from the PDS and made available elsewhere. To provide guidance, the FSWG’s proposed 
simplified example disclosures which will inter alia include “a new incorporation by 
reference regime identifying what information, when incorporated by reference, may be 
considered as part of the PDS.”62 While superannuation funds are permitted to incorporate 
certain information by reference in their PDSs, Corporations Regulations 200163 prescribe 
inclusion of specific core information.64 This ‘incorporate by reference’ approach is likely to 
simplify and reduce the size of PDSs but may in fact increase the complexity of 
superannuation fund disclosures if PDS users need to access multiple documents/sources to 
obtain all relevant and complete information they need for their decision-making.   
A key issue in the challenge to reduce the size and complexity of PDSs issued by 
superannuation funds and issuers/sellers of other more complex financial products is that a 
single PDS document is expected to provide information to large numbers of diverse 
investors. For example, a large accumulation-style superannuation fund may offer members 
choice from a set of pre-mixed investment options and/or specific asset classes. As the 
number of investment options increases, so does the length of the PDS because it is required 
                                                 
60 ASIC (2009), p 62. In response to criticisms of the effectiveness of the FSR disclosure regime and to 
complement the work of the FSWG, ASIC intends to commence a project to explore whether more effective 
disclosure can be achieved.  (ASIC, 2009, p 57) 
61 See Pearce (2007).  
62 ASIC (2009), p 62.    
63 Regulation 7.9.15DA(4).  
64 The ‘core’ information includes (CCH 2009, para 4-150):  
• a summary description of the purpose and key features of the product, if certain prescribed information 
was incorporated by reference 
• a summary description of the key risks of the product, if certain prescribed information was 
incorporated by reference 
• a statement setting out the name and contact details of the issuer of the financial product and, if the 
statement is a sale statement, the seller 
• most of the fees and costs template as prescribed in Pt 2 of Sch 10 of the Corporations Regulations 
(known as the enhanced dollar disclosure requirements) 
• the Consumer Advisory Warning prescribed in Pt 2 of Sch 10 of the Corporations Regulations 
• information about the dispute resolution system that covers complaints by holders of the product and 
about how that system can be accessed, and  
• information about any cooling-off regime that applies in respect of acquisitions of the product.  
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(and expected) that information is disclosed about the asset allocation, performance, risks, 
etc., for each of the investment options.  
An alternative to producing a static and long printed document, or a shorter PDS that refers to 
other documents/sources, might be an interactive web-delivered PDS where the information 
is personalised to the specific needs of the person accessing the information.65 For example, a 
superannuation fund member might seek information only about high growth investment 
options and would not need the information about other options. Similarly, other information, 
such as fees, could be tailored to the specific circumstances of the fund member (ie account 
balance and contribution rate), rather than the standardised fee disclosure currently 
required.66  
Customising disclosures to the specific needs and circumstances of individuals through a 
web-based interactive tool would significantly reduce the quantity and increase the relevance 
of the information presented. However, while such an approach may be technologically 
possible, it presents major challenges in the context of the existing legal framework67 in that 
it would be difficult for regulators to monitor and enforce compliance with disclosures 
prescribed by legislation. This customised approach is only likely to work well for 
individuals who have a clear idea of what information they are looking for; unsophisticated 
and less financially literate investors may have difficulty defining the parameters of the 
information they are seeking. 
Financial Literacy and the Role of the Regulator  
The role of government is to regulate capital markets without stifling the “creativity of 
capitalism”, while at the same time constraining “excesses that occur because of … animal 
spirits”.68 The question of how to achieve the balance between giving markets free rein and 
regulation has been debated with renewed vigour following the global financial crisis. As the 
dust settles from the crisis, the debate has turned from more regulation to how to devise 
                                                 
65 Vanguard Investments (2008). 
66 In accordance with Schedule 10 of Corporations Regulations 2001, superannuation funds are required to 
provide in their PDSs a standardised example of fees based on an account balance of $50,000 and contribution 
rate of $5000 per annum.  
67 Vanguard Investments (2008).  
68 Akerlof and Shiller (2009), p x. Akerlof and Shiller draw on Keynes’ view that “much economic activity is 
governed by animal spirits”, in that individuals have non-economic motives and ”are not always rational in 
pursuit of their economic interests” (emphasis in original): Akerlof and Shiller (2009), p ix. 
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smarter and more effective regulation to deal with the consequences of future crises.69 Lo 
observes that: 
 ... financial manias and panics cannot be legislated away, and may be an unavoidable 
aspect of modern capitalism - a consequence of the interactions between hardwired 
human behavior and the unfettered ability to innovate, compete, and evolve.70   
Accepting these interactions leads to a need to focus regulatory responses on addressing the 
unpreparedness of investors for financial losses arising from bubbles and crashes and not on 
financial loss per se. Accordingly, in Lo’s framework the primary role of regulation should 
be “to facilitate access to information and education, and to address market failures and 
human behavior”.71 Flowing from these two main regulatory justifications are numerous 
implications for regulatory reform. From a financial literacy perspective, facilitating access to 
appropriate information and education is a particularly relevant objective, but regulatory 
interventions aimed at achieving this objective need to implicitly recognise market failures 
and behavioural shortcomings of individuals. We next consider in the Australian context 
regulatory reforms directed at improving the financial literacy in the wake of the global 
financial crisis.  
Recent Financial Literacy Regulatory Initiatives in Australia 
A key response to various financial failures brought about by the global financial crisis has 
been the establishment by the Australian Government of an inquiry into financial products 
and services.72 In its submission to this inquiry, ASIC acknowledges that financial literacy 
levels in Australia are low (low levels of understanding about financial products and 
investing) and that there are significant consequential costs to individuals and the economy. 
As part of its responsibility in addressing financial literacy, ASIC73 lists four streams of 
initiatives that it intends to continue to pursue to foster a more financially literate Australia: 
(a) delivering financial literacy programs;  
(b) ensuring access to information and tools; 
                                                 
69 Lo (2009) 
70 Lo (2009), p2. 
71 Lo (2009), p3. While Lo concedes that economists usually attribute the need for regulation to market failures 
arising from “externalities, public goods, and incomplete markets”, he argues that there is an additional 
motivation for regulation: “human behavior that is driven not by logic and rationality, but by emotion”. These 
primary emotions include fear and greed. (Lo, 2009, p2). 
72 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into Financial Products and 
Services in Australia (2009). 
73 ASIC (2009), p79. 
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(c) looking beyond education to solutions that promote financial well-being; and  
(d) developing partnerships with industry and the community.  
 
The regulator’s strategy for the delivery of financial literacy programs is to use existing 
educational pathways, including through schools (to year 10) and the higher education 
institutions, and through employer and union-sponsored and community-based programs. 
Access to information and tools is intended to be achieved through ASIC website tools, 
publications and public seminars. A consumer/investor website is being developed to 
promote financial well-being. The objective of this website it to provide guidance to assist 
individuals meet their personalised goals in the absence of formal financial plans.  Finally, 
ASIC intends to harness the resources of the community, education and financial service 
providers through developing networks that promote best practice and knowledge sharing 
about financial literacy.74  
A key part of its work on ensuring access to information and tools is ASIC’s “Investing 
between the flags” project. This project is aimed at increasing consumer understanding such 
investment basics as diversification, asset allocation, and risk versus returns.75 In using this 
recognisable between-the-flags image, ASIC is seeking to cut through investment jargon to 
enable retail investors to understand when they are inside the flags and therefore in ‘patrolled 
waters’, and when they are taking on more risk in territory outside the flags.76 ‘Inside the 
flags’ is investing in financial products with known risks, such as bank deposits and 
diversified blue chip share portfolios, whereas ‘outside the flags’ is investing in riskier, more 
complex, leveraged, illiquid, and undiversified investments.77 ASIC uses the analogy of 
getting a stronger swimmer, in the form of an independent adviser, to go with investors who 
wish to swim outside the flags.78 As Cooper notes, investing between the flags always 
involves some risk; like swimming at the beach, it can never be risk-free.79  
While the simplicity of the between-the-flags approach to educating retail investors about 
investment risk is attractive and may alert and prevent some investors from taking on 
excessive investment risk, it is yet to be seen how this proposal will work in practice. 
                                                 
74 ASIC (2009). 
75 ASIC (2009). 
76 Cooper (2009b). 
77 Cooper (2009a). 
78 Cooper (2009a, 2009b). 
79 Cooper (2009b). 
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Moreover, this initiative, like the others proposed by ASIC, do not directly address 
differences in individual financial literacy levels and behavioural impediments to improving 
financial literacy. Although ASIC recognises the limitations of financial literacy and the need 
to “look beyond” its current and proposed initiatives to other regulatory responses, it 
nevertheless intends to pursue a universal education objective80: “it is important to continue 
to better educate people about financial issues … despite the inherent limitations of consumer 
education”.81   
 
Disappointingly, ASIC offers no specific regulatory responses to address the behavioural 
impediments to financial literacy. As a consequence, the regulator appears to have ignored 
the calls of Lo82 and others for initiatives that embed behavioural cross-checks in decision-
making by investors and agents that protect against behavioural shortcomings (inertia, loss 
aversion, overconfidence and excessive risk taking, etc). A more appropriate response would 
have been to embed tools in education programs and other initiatives that enable investors to 
identify their own behaviour biases and alert them when their investment decisions are likely 
to be adversely influenced by those biases. Additionally, in developing education programs 
and consumer protection policies, ASIC should make greater use of such techniques as 
‘nudging’ to steer investors in the right direction in their investment decisions.83 Nudging is 
likely to be particularly beneficial in addressing problems encountered in superannuation 
funds where many members are incapable or unwilling to make informed choices.    
Role of Industry in Improving Financial Literacy  
 
The OECD84 identifies that it is not just governments and regulators that have a responsibility 
to develop policies and implement programs to improve financial literacy levels among the 
general population, but rather, employers, unions, industry bodies, professional associations, 
and other organisations have an important role in educating consumers in financial matters. 
Accordingly, the Australian Government and regulator have adopted a partnership approach 
                                                 
80 ASIC concedes that it will take decades to improve financial literacy levels. Additionally, programs will need 
to be well resourced and require the cooperation of Government and industry to succeed (ASIC 2009, p 81). 
81 ASIC (2009), p78.  
82 Lo (2009).  
83 Thaler and Sunstein (2008) demonstrate how thoughtful “choice architecture” can be established by policy-
makers to nudge people in beneficial directions in their choices without restricting freedom of choice. They refer 
to this nudging intervention as “libertarian paternalism”. 
84 OECD (2005).  
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in promoting and supporting financial education programs delivered through schools, 
vocational and higher education, employer and union sponsored programs, and other 
community-based programs.85 Consistent with this approach, the Financial Literacy 
Foundation (FLF), established in 2005 by the Federal Government, was governed by a board 
comprising representatives from various business and community groups.86 Prior to its 
functions being transferred to ASIC in 2008, the FLF developed the Understanding Money 
website that provides financial literacy resources for individuals and education providers.87 
Those resources were developed in conjunction with industry partners, including professional 
accounting bodies (CPA Australia and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia) 
and industry bodies, such as the Investment and Financial Services Association and the 
Financial Planning Association.  A major focus of the FLF was to also work with State and 
Territory education authorities to incorporate financial literacy into school curricula. Since 
taking on the FLF functions, ASIC formed a “national, cross-sectoral community of 
practice”, which brings together up to 90 individuals who work in financial literacy in 
Australia and New Zealand (via video-link each month) “to build networks and promote best 
practice and knowledge sharing about financial literacy.”88 
In the superannuation context, at the time that superannuation choice was being debated, the 
Government considered the superannuation industry was primarily responsible for educating 
members about choice.89  Many superannuation funds accept their role in educating their 
members with most large funds, to varying degrees, offering members services and education 
programs to assist them to understand their superannuation.  However, there are two potential 
limitations of funds providing such education. First, the issue of whether the financial 
education they provide is objective and independent, rather than a marketing exercise biased 
towards superannuation and/or particular investment products offered by the fund.90 Second, 
superannuation funds are constrained by the ‘sole purpose test’91 in that a nexus must exist 
between education programs paid for out of members’ superannuation and providing benefits 
for their retirement (or in the event of death). Thus superannuation funds cannot provide 
                                                 
85 ASIC (2009), p 79.  
86 Following the transfer of the FLF functions to ASIC, the Government established the Financial Literacy 
Board, comprising representatives from industry and the community, to provide advice to the Government and 
ASIC on financial literacy issues (see http://www.flb.gov.au/).  
87 See http://www.understandingmoney.gov.au/   
88 ASIC (2009), p 81.  
89 See SSCS (1998), paragraph 14.2.  
90 Brown et al (2002).  
91 Section 62, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993.  
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members with broader financial education and advice on financial matters beyond their 
superannuation.  
Such limited education programs are unlikely to be sufficiently customised and 
comprehensive to adequately address the behavioural biases evident in individual investment 
decision making, unless the member pays for appropriate education or advice from sources 
other than their superannuation savings. These external sources are also not without their 
limitations. Similar to the recent debate about problems that consumers might encounter with 
distinguishing between whether a financial adviser is providing independent financial advice 
or selling product,92 consumers of financial education programs that are delivered by the 
private sector are likely to also have difficulty in identifying whether the programs are free of 
bias towards particular types of investment or products.  
 
A major challenge for policy-makers who are relying on industry and professional bodies to 
promote and deliver financial literacy programs to the wider community, is ensuring those 
programs are free from marketing products and other such activities that may lead to 
suboptimal financial outcomes for recipients of the programs. A second challenge is to ensure 
that educational programs and advice incorporate strategies that address the behavioural 
biases in investment decision by individuals93.  While there is evidence of action to address 
the first challenge, there is no evidence to date to suggest that the industry has attempted to 
alter its education programs, advice and products in ways that would specifically address 
those biases. 
Conclusion 
The global finance crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of retail investors to exposure to 
financial risks. Complex financial products originating from financial engineering combined 
with individuals’ poor financial literacy has opened gaps in consumer protection that need to 
be addressed through better market regulation and renewed focus on consumer education.  In 
this context, “financial education should be regarded as a key element of national and global 
stability. ... Looking ahead there is a need to develop a coherent and coordinated financial 
education strategy as a pillar of sound financial regulatory and supervisory framework”.94 For 
financial education and consumer protection to successfully enable individuals to better deal 
                                                 
92 See PJCCFS (2009b).  
93 See Guyatt (2009). 
94 Wehinger (2009), p 27. 
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with financial risks and responsibilities,95 requires those measures to take account of 
behavioural biases in their design and implementation. By recognising the pervasive effects 
of human nature, or animal spirits, in individuals’ responses when faced with the need to 
make financial decisions, such programs will go a long way towards building populations that 
are more resilient in the event of future financial downturns and economic shocks.  
 
  
                                                 
95 Wehinger (2009). 
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